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PROPOSITION 136 -- "TAXPAYERS RIGHT TO VOTE:" 
ANALYSIS OF ISSUES AND PROVISIONS 
Proposition 13, approved by the people in June 1978, 
contained provisions which required a two-thirds popular 
vote for local special taxes, and a two-thirds legislative 
vote for state tax increases. However, the Farrell decision 
defined "Special taxes" as taxes which are not general 
taxes. That decision effectively permitted general taxes 
(taxes for general purposes) to be imposed by a simple vote 
of the governing body of the local entity. 
In November 1986 the voters approved Proposition 62, 
which attempted, among other things, to "correct" the 
Farrell decision. However that proposition was a statutory 
rather than a constitutional change; therefore its 
provisions have been interpreted as not affecting charter 
cities, which are governed by the constitutional "municipal 
powers" doctrine (which provides that city charter 
provisions generally have priority over state statutes). 
Much of Proposition 136 is generally similar to the 
provisions of Proposition 62. But Proposition 136 is a 
constitutional amendment rather than a statutory initiative. 
Therefore it is believed that Proposition 136 will prevail 
over the municipal powers doctrine. 
on August 15, 1990, the Senate and Assembly Revenue and 
Taxation Committees and the Senate and Assembly Local 
Government Committees jointly held a hearing on 
Proposition 136 (along with three other propositions). The 
transcript of that hearing is available to the public from 
the Legislative Joint Publications Office, along with an 
earlier version of this analysis. This analysis benefits 
from the testimony provided at that hearing. A summary of 
the salient testimony is attached as Appendix D. 
I. TITLE; FINDINGS & DECLARATIONS; PURPOSE & INTENT 
SECTION 1. Title. This Act shall be known and may be 
cited as The Taxpayers Right-to-Vote Act of 1990. 
SECTION 2. Findings and Declarations. The People of 
the State of California hereby find and declare as 
follows: 
(a) Taxes should not be imposed on the People of 
California without their consent. 
(b) In order to protect all taxpayers from sudden and 
unreasonable increases in general taxes which would 
threaten their economic security, limitations should be 
placed on general tax increases and the imposition of new 
general taxes. 
(c) In order to protect targeted segments of 
taxpayers from special taxes imposed upon them alone, 
limitations should be placed on special tax increases and 
the imposition of new special taxes by special interests. 
(d) No increase in special taxes imposed by counties, 
special districts, charter cities, or general law cities. 
and no new special tax imposed by these entities, should 
take effect without a two-thirds vote of the People. 
(e) No increase in special taxes imposed by the State 
of California, and no new special tax imposed by the State 
of California, should take effect without a two-thirds 
vote of the People or a two-thirds vote of both houses of 
the Legislature. 
(f) No increase in general taxes imposed by the State 
of California, and no new general tax imposed by the State 
of California, should take effect without a majority vote 
of the people or a two-thirds vote of both houses of the 
Legislature. 
(g) ~o increase in general taxes imposed by counties, 
special di~ricts, charter cities, and general law cities, 
and no new general tax imposed by these entities, should 
take effect without a majority vote of the People. 
(h) No excessive and unfair special taxes with 
respect to tangible personal property should be imposed. 
(i) In keeping with the spirit of Proposition 13, 
except as provided in Article XIII A, §§ 1 and 2 of the 
California Constitution, no new ad valorem taxes on real 
property or sales or transaction taxes on the sale of real 
property may be imposed. 
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(e) To protect against the imposition of excessive 
and unfair special taxes with respect tangible personal 
property. 
(f) To prohibit the imposition of any new ad valorem 
taxes on real property or any transaction tax or sales tax 
on the sale or transfer or real property except as 
provided in Article XIII A, SS 1 and 2 of the California 
conatitution. 
%%. VOT%KQ RBQUIRIMIKTS roR STATB TAXIS 
Existing Section 3 Art II A of the constitution 
(enacted by Proposition 13) generally requires a two-third& 
leqialative vote for atate tax increaaea or new taxes. It 
also provides that no new ad valorem taxes on real property 
(i.e., taxes baaed on the value of real property), and new 
realty sales or trans may be imposed. 
Proposition 135 repeals the existing provisions of 
Section 3, and replaces them with a substantially expanded 
Section 3, which (1) distinguishes between "general" and 
"apecial" taxe1q (2) provides the specific method whereby 
the people, by initiative, may impose or increase state 
taxea1 (3) requires that special taxes on personal property 
... J -
must be based on value, and may not exceed the Article XIII 
real property tax rate (1% plus the add-on debt rate). 
4. Section 3 of XIII A of the 
California Constitution is repealed. 
See~*en-3~--Prem-an~-a£~er-~ae-e££ee~fve-~a~e-e£-~afs 
ar~fe±e;-any-eaaft~es-fn-s~a~e-~axes-eftae~e~-£er-~ne 
~Hr~eee-e£-inereasin~-revenHes-ee±~ee~e~-~Hrsuan~-~nere~e 
Wfte~her-~y-iftereased-ra~es-er-efta~~es-in-me~ne~s-e£ 
eem~u~a~ien-mus~-be-im~ese~-~y-aft-Ae~-~assea-ey-ne~-iess 
~aan-~we-~air~s-e£-a±±-memeers-e£-~ne-~e~is±a~ure7-exee~~ 
~ha~-fte-ftew-a~-vaierem-~axes-en-reai-~re~er~y;-er-sa±es-er 
~ransae~ien-~axes-eft-~ae-saies-e£-reai-~re~er~y-may-ee 
im~ese~~ 
SECTION 5. state Government General and Special Tax 
Limitation. Section 3 is hereby added to Article XIII A 
of the California constitution to read as follows: 
Section 3. (a) From and after the effective date of 
this section, any ... increases in State general or 
special taxes ... whether by increased rates, changes in 
methods of computation, any other increase in an existing 
tax, or any new tax must be imposed by an Act passed by 
not less than two-thirds of all members elected to each of 
the two houses of the Legislature, ••• or as provided in 
subsection (b). 
(b) From and after the effective date of this 
section, any increases in State taxes whether by increased 
rates, changes in methods of computation, any other 
increase in an existing tax, or any new tax also may be 
enacted by an initiative passed, in the case of a general 
tax, by not less than a majority vote of the voters voting 
in an election on the issue or, in the case of a special 
tax, and notwithstanding Article II, §10(a) of the 
California constitution, by not less than a two-thirds 
vote of the voters voting in an election on the issue, or 
as provided in subsection (a). 
(c) Except as provided in Article XIII A, §§1 and 2 
of the California constitution, no new ad valorem taxes on 
real property or sales or transactions taxes on the sale 
of real property may be imposed. 
(d) Any special tax with respect to tangible personal 
property enacted on or after November 6, 1990, must be an 
ad valorem tax and must comply with the provisions of 
Article XIII, §2 of the California Constitution. 
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(e) As used in this section, "general taxes" are 
taxes, including, but not limited to, income taxes, excise 
taxes, and surtaxes, levied for the general fund to be 
utilized for general governmental purpose; "special taxes" 
are taxes, including, but not limited to, income taxes, 
excise taxes, surtaxes, and tax increases, levied for a 
specific purpose or purposes or deposited into a fund or 
funds other than the general fund. Taxes on motor vehicle 
fuel shall be considered general taxes for purposes of 
this section. 
Proposition 136 issues: 
1. Bills containing offsetting tax increases and 
decreases. The reworded version of 
subdivision (a) is intended to prevent 
legislation containing a mixture of tax 
increases and decreases from being passed by a 
majority vote. Is this an undue restriction 
on the power of the legislature to enact 
packages of tax legislation? 
Most significant federal conformity 
legislation involves offsetting revenue 
increases and decreases. While it has been 
generally conceded that our tax laws should be 
kept closely in conformity with federal laws, 
this practice will now require a two-thirds 
vote, even for packages which do not increase 
total revenue. Does the relatively 
straightforward annual housekeeping decision 
to conform our tax laws with federal tax 
changes merit this super-majority measure? 
2. Anti-"wash bill" provision has limited impact. 
Despite the drafters' apparent intent to 
prevent adoption of "wash" tax bills (those 
with offsetting tax increases and decreases) 
by a majority vote, it is not clear from the 
wording that the proposition will accomplish 
its goal. The language can probably still be 
interpreted as similar to present law--
allowing "revenue neutral" bills comprising 
both tax increases and decreases. An income 
tax bill, for example, which reduces taxes on 
low income taxpayers, and is balanced by a tax 
rate increase on upper income taxpayers, would 
probably still be permissible. 
3. Anti-"nickel-a-drink" provision. The 
restriction on special taxes on tangible 
personal property was specifically designed to 
- 5 -
void the alcoholic beverage tax increase 
contained in Proposition 134. However it will 
also forever restrict the use of state taxes 
on tangible personal property, including sales 
taxes, from being directed toward particular 
needs, even when approved by the people 
(except in the event of a disaster or 
emergency--see Section 7, below}. Is this 
restriction warranted? What is so special 
about taxes on a unit basis (such as on 
alcoholic beverages and tobacco products) 
which requires this extraordinary provision? 
This provision could prevent the Legislature 
from adopting an excise tax on certain 
products (e.g., chemicals, tires) for an 
environmental clean-up fund. 
4. Taxes posing as "fees". The proposition 
contains no definition of "taxes." Many of 
Proposition 136's proponents have in the past 
argued for treatment of motor vehicle taxes as 
"fees." The same logic may be used to avoid 
the two-thirds vote requirement in other 
areas. Perhaps an income tax increase could 
be billed as a "health care fee" since all 
taxpayers will surely need health care 
sometime or other? It may be that the 
restrictions contained in this proposition 
will serve as the "necessity" for further 
rounds of such fiscal "invention" in future 
years. 
5. New taxing authority? There is a conflict 
between subdivisions (b), (c) and (d). 
Subdivision (b) allows the people by either a 
majority or two-thirds vote to enact ANY 
increases in state taxes, or ANY new taxes. 
Subdivisions (c) and (d) restrict what taxes 
the people may enact. Which takes precedence-
-the authority in (b) or the limitations of 
(c) and (d)? 
Or do subdivisions (b) and (c) only apply to 
legislatively imposed taxes, since 
subdivision (a) is less broad in that it 
provides that any legislatively imposed tax 
increase MUST be imposed by a two-thirds vote? 
This would in effect grant the people the 
right to impose property taxes for state 
general purposes, for example, or to enact a 
state realty transfer tax. 
By referring to ad valorem property taxes in 
limitations , the 
state-wide 
purposes (such as 
that property 
state bond issues. 
increase in property 
purposes. 
may contemplate 
for state 
) It may be 
now used to back 
could involve a vast 
rates for state 
6. for corporation tax increases? 
all taxes must be either 
general taxes or special taxes. However this 
requirement not for state taxes. 
Furthermore, (e) does not appear 
to include 11 tax 11 for the 
general fund within definition of 11 general 
taxes." There thus to be a hybrid 
category of "tax increases" for general 
purposes which would be considered neither 
"general taxes 11 nor "special taxes," which 
therefore are presumably NOT subject to the 
legislative vote. This would be a 
substantial broadening of legislative taxing 
powers. 
It may be that increases in the state 
corporate franchise tax, which is not an 
income tax, an excise tax or a surtax, would 
qualify for this "neither fish nor fowl" 
category of taxes which may be increased by a 
majority legislative vote. 
7. Authority to use gas tax for non-
transportation purposes? By including taxes 
on motor vehicle fuel within the definition of 
"general taxes" (to be utilized for general 
governmental purposes), Proposition 136 may 
effectively repeal Article XIX's restrictions 
on use of motor vehicle fuel taxes for highway 
and transportation purposes. 
8. Two-thirds vote for tax decreases? Some 
people believe that revenues are increased 
when tax rates are lowered. If this is true, 
might this proposition require tax rate 
decreases to be passed by a two-thirds vote, 
since they would result in increased tax 
revenues? 
9. State tax I local tax ambiguity. Although new 
Section 3 is titled by the initiative as 
providing a "State Government General and 
Special Tax Limitation," that title is not 
part of the Constitution. Thus, subdivisions 
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(c), (d) to taxes 
, not just 
there are 
and similar 
is not 
III. VOTING LOCAL TAXES 
SECTION 6. XIII A of the 
California Canst 
see~~e"-~~--e~~~e~7-ee~~~~e~-a"a-~~ee~ai-a~s~~~e~s1-by 
a-~ew-~fi~~as-ve~e-er-~he-~~a~~£~ea-elee~e~s-er-s~ea 
a~s~~~e~;-may-~m~ese-~pee~ai-~axe~-e"-s~eh-a~s~~~e~, 
exee~~-aa-vaie~em-~axe~-e"-~ea~-~~e~e~~y-e~-a-~~a"sae~~e" 
~ax-e~-saies-~ax-eH-~eai-p~epe~~y-w~~a~"-s~ea-e~~y1-ee~"~Y 
e~-spee~al-e~s~~~e~~ 
SECTION 7. Local Government and District General and 
Special Tax Limitation. Section 4 is hereby added to 
Article XIII A of the California Constitution to read as 
follows: 
Section 4. (a) Article II, §9(a) of 
the California Constitution, no local government or 
district, whether or not authorized to levy a property 
tax, may impose any new general tax or increase any 
existing general tax on such lity or district unless 
and until such 1 tax or increase is 
submitted to the of local government or of 
the district and by a majority vote of the voters 
voting in an election on the issue. 
(b) Art II, §9(a) of the 
California , no local government or district 
may impose any new special or increase any existing 
special tax on such local or district unless and until 
such proposed special tax or increase is submitted to the 
electorate of the local government or of the district and 
enacted a vote of the voters voting in an 
election on revenues from any special tax 
shall be used only for or service for which it 
was imposed, and for no other purpose whatsoever. 
(c) Except as provided Article XIII A, §§ 1 and 2 
of the California Constitution, no local government or 
district may impose any new ad valorem taxes on real 
- 8 -
property or a transaction tax or sales tax on the sale or 
transfer of local government or 
district. 
(d) A tax subject to the vote requirements of 
subdivisions (a) or (b) of shall be proposed 
by an ordinance or legislative body of 
the local government or of the district. The ordinance or 
resolution shall include the type of tax and maximum rate, 
if any, of tax to be levied, the method of collection, the 
date upon which an election shall be held on the issue, 
and, if a special tax, the purpose or service for which 
its imposition is sought. 
(e) As used in this section, "local government" means 
any city, county, city and county, including a chartered 
city or county or city and county, or any public or 
municipal corporation; "district" means an agency of the 
state, formed pursuant to general law or special act, for 
the local performance of governmental or proprietary 
functions within limited boundaries. 
(f) As used in this section, "general taxes" are 
taxes levied for the general fund to be utilized for 
general governmental purposes; "special taxes" are taxes 
levied for a specific purpose or purposes or deposited 
into a fund or funds other than the general fund. As used 
in this section, "voter" is a person who is eligible to 
vote under the provisions governing the applicable 
election. All taxes imposed by any entity of local 
government shall be deemed to be either general taxes or 
special taxes. Sales and use taxes voted on at a local 
level for transportation purposes shall be considered 
general taxes for purposes of this section. 
Sections 6 & 7 of the initiative, replacing Section 4 of 
Article XIII A, place in the State Constitution requirements 
for levies of new and increased taxes. These requirements 
expand the requirements imposed since 1978. 
Existing Requirements 
Since the adoption of Proposition 13 in 1978, 
initiatives, statutes, court decision and legal opinions 
have combined to limit local government 1 s ability to raise 
or impose taxes. The following a brief history of these 
local limitations: 
Proposition 13. This initiative established 
the basic tax limitations. It introduced, but 
did not define, the distinction between 
"general" tax levies imposed with a majority 
- 9 -
vote and 11 
2/3 
in the 
approved with a 
was supplied 
City and County of San Francisco v Farrell. 
When the San Francisco voters approved a gross 
receipts tax 55 margin, the city 
controller refused to certify that the funds 
were available for appropriation. The 
controller, John Farrell, argued that the tax 
levy was a special tax, imposed without the 
2/3 vote required by Proposition 
13. In this case, the Appellate Court defined 
"special" tax as a tax levied for a specific 
purpose. Under this definition, the San 
Francisco tax was not a special tax. Indeed, 
under the Farrell decision, taxes which were 
not "special" taxes could be imposed by a 
local government by a simple vote of the 
governing body. (Proposition 62, approved by 
the voters in 1986, fied the Farrell 
definition, and added the further requirement 
that "general" taxes may only be imposed by a 
majority popular vote.) 
Los Angeles Transportation Commission v 
Richmond. The court considered whether a 
transit district could levy a transactions and 
use tax ("local sales tax") without meeting 
the stricter special tax super-majority vote 
requirements. The court ruled that the higher 
vote requirements did not apply because: (a) 
the transit district had taxing authority 
existing prior to the enactment of Proposition 
13, and (b) even not have this 
existing authority, ition 13 was a 
property tax measure and did not apply to a 
district which had no property taxing 
authority. 
The court left whether the lack of 
property tax authority was in itself 
sufficient to exempt a district or agency from 
the special tax provisions. Questions remain 
about the vote requirements for general tax 
levies made by special stricts. 
Proposition 62. With this statutory 
initiative, the voters attempted to codify the 
distinctions between special and general 
taxes, as defined in Farrell. 
- 10 -
The 
to 
taxes by 
of the 
remain about 
Legislature 
general taxes 
In a case 
initiative 
opined that 
charter 
vote of 
the 
lature 
1 taxes. 
use of special 
districts 
general 
the terms 
questions 
under which the 
district to levy 
vote. 
to adoption of the 
, the appellate court 
62 did not require 
general taxes to a 
Schopflin v Dole. In case, the court 
addressed questions about election 
requirements imposed by Proposition 62. 
Although the case has been decertified and 
therefore appl only to taxes Sonoma 
County, logic of the case is important. 
In Schopflin, the court he that the vote 
requirements 62, amounting to a 
referendum on a , are a of 
Article 2, Cali 
Constitution. questions about 
whether of 
terms in requiring 
1. 
Cohn v City of Oakland. case may be 
viewed as a broadening of the taxing authority 
permitted under ition 13, at least for 
charter c ls court recently 
has upheld the 's increase in 
the realty transfer tax, stating that 
"increase of the tax issue was not 
prohibited by XIIIA because it was a 
general tax." decision, other 
charter c San Francisco --
have this tax. 
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Legislative authorization 
Within this context, 
authorize new local 
In particular: 
lature has attempted to 
general taxing authority. 
SB 142 (Deddeh)--Chapter 786, Statutes of 
1987, authorized counties to create 
transportation districts. The legislation 
also authorized the district to fund 
transportation improvements with an additional 
sales tax levy of up to 1%. The tax could be 
imposed with a majority vote of the 
electorate. 
AB 999 (Farr)--Chapter 1257, Statutes of 1987, 
authorized counties to impose half-cent sales 
tax increases in small counties, provided that 
the increase was placed on the ballot by the 
board of supervisors and approved by a 
majority of the electorate. 
AB 2505 (Stirling)--Chapter 1258, Statutes of 
1987, authorized San Diego to establish a jail 
financing agency and to levy a half-cent sales 
tax with approval by a simple majority of the 
voters. 
AB 1067 (Hauser}--Chapter 1335, Statutes of 
1989, authorized the formation of a local jail 
authority, whose governing board had a 
majority made up of county supervisors. The 
legislation authorized the jail's governing 
board to levy a sales tax increase with a 
majority voter approval. 
The provisions of AB 2505 and AB 1067 were challenged 
when the trial courts invalidated the bills' simple majority 
prov1s1ons. In these cases, judges found that the 
legislation made an impermissible attempt to circumvent the 
2/3 vote requirements on special taxes. However in the 
San Diego case (AB 2505), the appellate court reversed the 
decision on the grounds that Proposition 62's two-thirds 
vote requirement is an unconstitutional referendum by 
initiative. 
In addition, the Attorney General issued an opinion 
(number 89-604) stating that the popular vote requirement in 
AB 999 was tantamount to a referendum on a tax levy. As 
such, the referendum was in conflict with Section 9 of 
Article II of the State Constitution, and therefore 
unconstitutional. 
- 12 -
Thus, 
there cons 
initiative 1 s vote 
lies in three areas: 
Proposition 62, 
ication of the 
, the confusion 
Proposition 62 requirements do not apply 
equally to all local governments. Given the 
court's decision in Jarvis v Eu, charter 
cities are subject to different requirements 
than other local governments. In addition, 
the decision in Schopflin v Dole, 
Sonoma exempt from the 
Propos Thus, the tax 
requirements imposed by Proposition 62 apply 
differently depending on which local 
jurisdiction is imposing the tax. 
Uncertainty about whether a statute can 
reguire referenda on tax levies. Section 9 
(a), Article II of the state Constitution 
prohibits referenda on tax levies. The 
Attorney General believes that this provision 
prohibits the State from authorizing the levy 
of a local tax subject to a local vote. Under 
what circumstances can the Legislature 
authorize tax levies? Under what 
circumstances can a local governing board 
impose a new tax or higher levy? 
Uncertainty about tax levies made by special-
purpose districts. When does a 
special-purpose district funct as an "alter 
ego 11 of a county of supervisors? If a 
district does function as an alter ego, must 
it always secure a 2/3 vote on tax levies? 
Proposition 136 addresses some of this confusion, but 
does not provide explicit guidance about the special-purpose 
districts. 
Local Taxing Authority 
Article XI of the California Constitution permits a 
city, by a majority vote of its electors, to adopt a charter 
for the purpose of enacting ordinances relating to its 
municipal affairs. As part of this constitutional grant of 
authority, charter cities have broad powers to levy taxes to 
support municipal activities (subject to voter approval of 
special taxes). 
In 1982, the Legislature provided to those cities which 
had not adopted charters, and which operated under general 
state law, the same taxing powers as charter cities (Chapter 
- 13 -
327, Statutes of 1982). Previously these general law cities 
had been able to levy license, transient 
occupancy and transfer taxes. Through 1990, 
counties' taxing authority is limited to the levying of the 
transient occupancy and property transfer taxes which do not 
overlap taxes imposed their cities. Beginning on January 
1, 1991, pursuant to SB 2557 (Maddy), Chapter 466, Statutes 
of 1990, counties may levy utility users' and business 
license taxes in their unincorporated areas. 
Business license taxes may be levied at a flat 
rate or based on the number of employees, 
receipts, sales or quantity of goods produced. 
No taxes may be levied on business income 
since the state has reserved the right to tax 
income. 
Property transfer taxes are levied on the 
sellers of real property. There is a 
statutory rate of $.55 per $500 of value which 
is exceeded by some charter cities. Cities 
and counties share the tax proceeds in 
incorporated areas. 
Transient occupancy taxes are levied upon 
those who occupy lodging for less than 30 
days. Rates are set locally by cities and by 
counties in unincorporated areas. 
Utility users taxes may be levied on all or 
some of public utility services (gas, 
electricity, telephone, water, cable 
television) 
The following table shows the revenues generated by 
these taxes in 1987-88 and the proportion they represent of 
the total amount of general tax revenue available to local 
agencies for expenditure. In total, these taxes (and other 
nonproperty taxes) account for approximately 23 percent of 
general tax revenues. Appendix B contains an inventory of 
local taxing powers. 
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Totals 
Property 
Sales 
Amount of 
1987-88 
Taxes Collected 
in llions) 
san Francisco 
Business License 
TOT 
$1,487 
2,048 
436 
301 
91 
687 
425 
$5,475 
,011 
287 
0 
37 
101 
0 
$340 
77 
19 
61 
19 
34 
Property transfer 
Utility Users 
Other 
Totals 
Source: State Controllers' Off 
Proposition 136 issues: 
$4,496 
129 
$679 
1. Issues common to both state and local taxes. 
The provisions of subdivisions (a), (b), (c) 
and (f) are very similar to those governing 
state-levied taxes. Many of the same issues 
raised above apply here as well. 
2. How are conflicts between Proposition 62 and 
Proposition 136 to be resolved? The 
initiative does not repeal statutory 
provisions of Proposition 62. The initiative, 
a constitutional amendment, is similar to, but 
not duplicative of, Proposition 62. By 
itself, the initiative does not repeal these 
similar sections, though the Legislature has 
some power to amend the statutory provisions 
of Proposition 62. Should voters assume that 
the Legislature will amend the statutory 
provisions of Proposition 62 to conform with 
constitutional provisions of Proposition 136? 
Should the Legislature assume that the 
initiative's drafters intended that existing 
statutes be maintained in their current form? 
If not, why did the drafters not propose to 
amend or repeal the statutory provisions as 
part of Proposition 136? 
3. Is a referendum required on tax levies? 
Section 9 of Article II has been interpreted 
to prevent referenda on tax levies. This 
measure does not repeal that section. Is a 
successful vote on Proposition 136 sufficient 
to void the existing prohibition on referenda 
of tax levies? 
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control over revenue side 
' abilities to 
they have less 
of their 
budgets. Does the 
governing boards' 
unduly restrict 
authority? 
4. Special-purpose districts. Proposition 136 
does not fully address the tax requirements of 
special-purpose districts. This initiative is 
silent on how to identify when a special-
purpose district an "alter ego" of the 
county board of supervisors. 
5. "District" may include state agencies. The 
definition of "district" may include state 
agencies. Subdivision (e) provides that 
"'district' means any agency of the state, 
formed pursuant to general law or special act, 
for the local performance of governmental or 
proprietary functions within limited 
boundaries." "District" might include a local 
office of the Board of Equalization, which 
"imposes" taxes within its designated 
boundaries. Or it might include the state 
agency which imposes the "landing tax" on 
various fish and frogs, which the 
proposition's sponsors feature in their 
promotional brochure. 
Whether this further limits state taxing 
authority, or grants additional leeway, 
remains to be seen. For example, it is not 
clear what "voters" and "electorate" means for 
"districts" which are state agencies or 
divisions thereof. Might it mean the board 
members directing the "district?" 
6. Existing local realty transfer taxes appear to 
be repealed. Subdivision (c) provides that 
"except as provided in §§1 and 2 of 
the California Constitution, no 
local government or district may 
impose any new ad valorem taxes on 
real property or a transaction tax 
or sales tax on the sale or transfer 
or real property." 
As the word "new" seems only to modify "ad 
valorem taxes on real property," the language 
appears to require repeal of existing realty 
- 16 -
transfer taxes 
than $200 
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(Note that 
taxes, 
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prohibit new 
state level. ) 
icable to local 
provision 
appear to 
taxes at the 
7. Intent. The sections 
discuss 1 on imposition of 
taxes, while discusses limitations on 
tax levies. Is there a difference 
between the intent and the text? 
IV. DISASTER PROVISIONS 
SECTION 8. Disaster and Emergency Relief. Section 7 
is hereby added to Article XIII A of the California 
Constitution to read as follows: 
Section 7. The provisions of sections 3(a) and (d) of 
this article which impose limits on new or existing State 
taxes may be suspended by a two-thirds vote of the 
Legislature and the approval of the governor in order to 
permit funds to be raised for up to two years for disaster 
relief required by earthquake, fire, flood, or similar 
natural disaster or for emergencies declared by the 
Governor. The provisions of sections 4(a) and (b) of this 
article which impose limits on new or existing local taxes 
may be suspended by a two-thirds vote of the legislative 
body of the local government or district, as defined in 
section 4(e) above, in order to permit funds to be raised 
for up to two years for disaster relief required by 
earthquake, fire, flood, or similar natural disaster or 
for emergencies declared by the governor. 
Proposition 136 issues: 
1. Disaster vs. emergency. Presumably the 
Governor, in declaring an emergency, is not 
limited to natural disasters. Also, 
"emergency" appears to be broader than 
"disaster" and could embrace unnatural 
disasters such as recession, plant closings, 
energy crisis, war, etc. 
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2. Two-year limit. two limit appears to 
apply to the vote rather than to 
the disaster. , if disaster relief 
is required more than two years, a 
subsequent two-thirds vote would be necessary 
to again suspend the Section 3 or 4 vote 
requirements. 
3. Does spending for police and fire protection 
constitute "disaster relief 11 ? A local 
government may be able to avoid the popular 
vote requirement for fire, flood or earthquake 
programs, simply by declaring those programs 
to be disaster related. "Disaster 
preparedness" could be argued to be a before-
the-fact form of "disaster relief." 
4. Tax increases with a majority vote. This 
section states that Section 3(a), which 
imposes a two-thirds vote requirement on tax 
increases, may be suspended in the event of a 
natural disaster or emergency with a two-
thirds vote of the legislature and approval by 
the Governor. If this section is suspended as 
part of a bill providing, for example, 
appropriations for disaster relief (a two-
thirds vote bill, anyway, because of the 
appropriation) , then it appears that tax 
increases could approved for the next two 
years with a major vote as long as the 
increased revenues were used in some 
connection with the disaster or emergency. 
V. LIBERAL CONSTRUCTION 
SECTION 9. Liberal Construction. The provisions of 
this Act shall be liberally construed to effect its 
purposes. 
This is a standard section which effectively asks courts 
and those responsible for implementing the initiative to 
give the benefit of the doubt to the drafters of the 
- 18 -
VI. EFFECTIVE 
1. 
2. 
measure on same 
of this measure 
entirety and 
vo and without 
approval. This 
other itiative on 
that a method 
authorized by 
measure 1 null and 
therefore 
other 
initiat (Propositions 129, 133 and 135). 
By being effect the before the other 
three initiat are , it attempts 
to preempt and nulli them. 
Article XVIII, Section 1 provides that "the 
Legislature ... may propose an amendment or 
revision of the Constitution .... " Section 2 
provides that "the Legislature ... may submit 
at a general election the question whether to 
call a convention to revise the 
Constitution .... " Section 3 provides that 
"the electors may amend the Constitution by 
initiative." [emphasis added] The 
definitions of "amendment 11 and "revision" were 
set forth in the analysis of Proposition 7 on 
the November 1962 ballot: "amendments" are 
specific and limited changes in the 
Constitution, while "revisions" are broad 
changes in all or a substantial part thereof. 
Proposition 136 intends both to change how 
taxes may be enacted as well as to limit the 
ability of other initiatives to impose taxes. 
This latter attempt may be a revision rather 
than an amendment, and may thus be invalid, 
since the initiative may not be used to revise 
the Constitution. 
3. Constitutional or statutory status? Note that 
Section 11 would not become part of the 
Constitution, so its stature is probably lower 
than that of constitutional language. It may 
therefore have no impact on the effectiveness 
of constitutional provisions. 
4. Effective date ambiguity. Article II, Section 
10 (a) provides that "an initiative statute or 
referendum ... takes effect the day after the 
election unless the measure provides 
otherwise." As Proposition 136 is neither an 
initiative statute nor a referendum, it is not 
altogether clear when it takes effect. Nor is 
it clear that even an initiative statute may 
take effect at a time prior to the completion 
of the election (e.g., the day of the 
election). 
5. Legislative Counsel opinion. The above points 
are more fully examined in the attached 
Legislative counsel opinion (Appendix C.), 
which concludes that Proposition 136: 
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"is constitutionally invalid because it 
violates the s ect rule and 
also may a revis , and not 
amendment, of the California 
Constitution .... Moreover, we think 
that giving effect to the proposed 
effective date of the Taxpayers Act, 
November 6, 1990, the day of the 1990 
general election, may operate to impair 
the right of the voters on that day to 
propose statutes by initiative and to 
approve them by a majority vote. 11 
VII. SEVERABILITY 
SECTION 12. Severability. If any provision of this 
Act, or part thereof, is for any reason held to be invalid 
or unconstitutional, the remaining sections shall not be 
affected, but shall remain in full force and effect, and 
to this end the provisions of this Act are severable. 
This is a boiler-plate severability clause. 
Analysis prepared by: 
Martin Helmke & Anne Maitland, 
Senate Revenue & Taxation Committee 
John Decker, Assembly Local Government Committee 
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APPENDIX A 
TEXT OF PROPOSITION 136 
A-1 

APPENDIX B 
INVENTORY OF LOCAL TAXING POWERS 
Prepared by Peter Detwiler 
Senate Local Government Committee 
B-1 
"AN INVENTORY OF LOCAL TAX POWERS" 
These two tables report the tax authorities available to 
California local governments. TABLE I lists the tax 
authorities by type of agency: cities, counties, special 
districts, and school districts. TABLE II lists the same 
information by the types of programs which may be financed. 
When using these tables, please keep in mind: 
• Parcel taxes. Special taxes under the Mello-Roos Act 
and special taxes authorized for special districts are not 
specifically restricted to certain tax bases. Most local 
agencies use these special tax powers to levy "per parcel 
taxes," where a uniform charge is levied against each parcel. 
• Ad valorem taxes. Some statutes still seem to allow 
special districts to levy ad valorem property taxes. Propo-
sition 13 superseded these laws but they still remain on the 
books. These tables ignore them. 
• Incomplete. This effort may be the first attempt to 
list all local tax authorities. Given the incremental nature 
of legislating, the tables may not be complete. 
B-2 
OJ 
I 
w 
AGENCY 
Cities 
Charter 
General law 
All cities 
"AN INVENTORY OF LOCAL TAX POWERS" 
TABLE 1: TAX AUTHORITY, BY TYPE OF AGENCY 
1M 
Any tax base 
Any tax base 
Admissions tax 
Business license tax 
Parking tax 
Real property transfer 
Sales and use tax 
AUTHORITY 
California Constitution Art. XI, Sec. 5 
Government Code Section 37100.5 
California Constitution Art. XI, Sec. 5 
Government Code Section 37100 
Revenue and Taxation Code Section 16000 
California Constitution Art. XI, Sec. 5 
Revenue and Taxation Code Section 11901 
Revenue and Taxation Code Section 7200 
Transient occupancy tax Revenue and Taxation Code Section 7280 
Utility user tax California Constitution Art. XI, Sec. 5 
Ambulance service Government Code Section 53313 (b) 
Child care facilities Government Code Section 53313.5 (d) 
Child care insurance Government Code Section 53313.5 (d) 
Facilities 
Fire protection 
Flood and storm water 
services 
Graffiti removal and 
prevention 
Library facilities 
Library services 
Government Code Section 53313.5 (g) 
Government Code Section 53313 (b) 
Government Code Section 53978 
Government Code Section 53313 (d) 
Revenue and Taxation Code Section 7287 
Government Code Section 53313.5 (c) 
Government Code Section 53313 (c) 
Government Code Section 53717 
COMMENTS 
A tax to raise revenues for municipal purposes is a "municipal affair" and 
constitutionally protected from legislative interference, if the tax base 
has not been preempted by the state or federal governments. 
A general law city can levy any tax that a charter city can levy. However, 
Proposition 62's voting requirements apply to general law cities. 
No specific authority; cities tax admission to theaters and sports events. 
No specific authority; cities tax the privilege of renting parking spaces. 
Limited by California Constitution Art. XIIIA, Sec. 4; in litigation. 
No specific authority; cities tax the consumption of utilities. 
Special tax under the Mello-Roos Act. 
Special tax under the Mello-Roos Act. 
Special tax under the Mello-Roos Act; a city can finance insurance costs but 
not the "other operational costs" of child care facilities. 
A city can finance any facility with a special tax under the Mello-Roos Act. 
Special tax under the Mello-Roos Act. 
Special tax. 
Special tax under the Mello-Roos Act. 
Special tax on spray paint cans and markers; added by AB 3580 (Katz, 1990). 
Special tax under the Mello-Roos Act. 
Special tax under the Mello-Roos Act. 
Special tax. 
c:o 
I 
+::> 
Counties 
Museum and cultural 
programs Government Code Section 53313 (c) 
Open space facilities Government Code Section 53313.5 (a) 
Paramedic service Government Code Section 53313 (b) 
Park and recreation 
programs Government Code Section 53313 (c) 
Park facilities Government Code Section 53313.5 (a) 
Police protection Government Code Section 53313 (a) 
Government Code Section 53978 
Underground utilities Government Code Section 53313.5 (e) 
Business license tax Revenue and Taxation Code Section 7284 
Real property transfer Revenue and Taxation Code Section 11901 
Sates and use tax Revenue and Taxation Code Section 7200 
Transactions and use tax Revenue and Taxation Code Section 7285 
Transactions and use tax Revenue and Taxation Code Section 7285.5 
Transient occupancy tax Revenue and Taxation Code Section 16000 
Utility user tax 
Ambulance service 
Child care facilities 
Child care insurance 
Facilities 
Fire protection 
Flood and storm water 
services 
Graffiti removal and 
prevention 
library facilities 
library service 
Mosquito abatement 
Museum and cultural 
programs 
Open space facilities 
Revenue and Taxation Code Section 7284 
Government Code Section 53313 (b) 
Government Code Section 53313.5 (d) 
Government Code Section 53313.5 (d) 
Government Code Section 53313.5 (g) 
Government Code Section 53313 (b) 
Government Code Section 53978 
Government Code Section 53313 (d) 
Revenue and Taxation Code Section 7287 
Government Code Section 53313.5 (c) 
Government Code Section 53313 (c) 
Government Code Section 53717 
Government Code Section 25842.5 
Government Code Section 53313 (c) 
Government Code Section 53313.5 (a) 
Special tax under the Mello-Roos Act. 
Special tax under the Mello-Roos Act. 
Special tax under the Mello-Roos Act. 
Special tax under the Mello-Roos Act. 
Special tax under the Mello-Roos Act. 
Special tax under the Mello-Roos Act. 
Special tax. 
Special tax under the Mello-Roos Act. 
Added by SB 2557 (Maddy, 1990), effective January 1, 1991. 
limited by California Constitution Art. XII lA, Sec. 4; in litigation. 
General tax with majority voter approval; extended to all counties by AB 
3670 (Farr, 1990). 
A county can set up "an authority for special purposes" and levy a general 
tax with majority voter approval; extended to all counties by AB 3670 (Farr, 
1990). 
Added by SB 2557 (Maddy, 1990), effective January 1, 1991. 
Special tax under the Mello-Roos Act. 
Special tax under the Mello·Roos Act. 
Special tax under the Mello-Roos Act; a county can finance insurance costs 
but not the "other operational costs" of child care facilities. 
A county can finance any facility with a Mello-Roos Act special tax. 
Special tax under the Mello-Roos Act. 
Special tax. 
Special tax under the Mello-Roos Act. 
Special tax on spray paint cans and markers; added by AB 3580 (Katz, 1990). 
Special tax under the Mello·Roos Act. 
Special tax under the Mello-Roos Act. 
Special tax. 
Identical to the tax powers of mosquito abatement districts. 
Special tax under the Mello-Roos Act. 
Special tax under the Mello·Roos Act. 
co 
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All special 
districts 
Coast Life Support 
District 
County service 
areas 
County water 
districts 
Fire protection 
districts 
Flood control 
districts 
Hospital districts 
Library districts 
Mosquito abatement 
Paramedic service 
Park facilities 
Park and recreation 
programs 
Police protection 
Underground utilities 
Facilities 
Ambulance service 
Any county service 
Fire protection 
Fire protection 
Ambulance service 
Fire protection 
Paramedic service 
Flood and storm water 
services 
Hospital services 
Library facilities 
Library services 
Government Code Section 53313 (b) 
Government Code Section 53313.5 (a) 
Government Code Section 53313 (c) 
Government Code Section 53313 (a) 
Government Code Section 53978 
Government Code Section 53313.5 (e) 
Government Code Section 53313.5 (g) 
Sec. 70, Chap. 375, Stats. of 1986 
Government Code Section 25210.6a 
Government Code Section 25210.59 
Water Code Section 31120 
Government Code Section 53313 (b) 
Health and Safety Code Section 13913 
Government Code Section 53313 (b) 
Government Code Section 53978 
Health and Safety Code Section 13913 
Government Code Section 53313 (b) 
Health and Safety Code Section 13913 
Government Code Section 53313 (c) 
Government Code Section 53730.01 
Government Code Section 53313.5 c) 
Government Code Section 53313 (c) 
Government Code Section 53717 
Special tax. 
Special tax under the Mello-Roos Act. 
Special tax under the Mello-Roos Act. 
Special tax under the Mello-Roos Act. 
Special tax. 
Special tax under the Mello-Roos Act. 
Any special distict can finance any facility with a special tax under the 
Mello-Roos Act. 
Special tax. 
Special tax. 
Identical to tax powers of fire protection districts. 
Identical to tax powers of fire protection districts. 
Special tax under the Mello-Roos Act. 
Special tax. 
Special tax under the Mello·Roos Act. · 
Special tax. 
Special tax. 
Special tax under the Mello-Roos Act. 
Special tax 
Special tax under the Mello-Roos Act. 
Special tax. 
Special tax under the Mello·Roos Act. 
Special tax under the Mello-Roos Act. 
Special tax. 
OJ 
I 
0'1 
districts Mosquito abatement 
Municipal utility 
districts Underground utilities 
Municipal water 
districts 
Pest abatement 
districts 
Public utilities 
district 
Recreation & park 
districts 
Redevelopment 
agencies 
Regional park & open 
Fire protection 
Pest abatement 
Fire protection 
Underground utilities 
Open space facilities 
Park facilities 
Park progrMIS 
Fire protection 
Recreation programs 
Sates and use taxes 
space districtsOpen space facilities 
Park facilities 
Park programs 
Recreation programs 
Health and Safety Code Section 2303 
Government Code Section 53313.5 (e) 
Water Code Section 71680 
Health and Safety Code Section 2871.8 
Public Utilities Code Section 16463.5 
Government Code Section 53313.5 (e) 
Government Code Section 53313.5 (a) 
government Code Section 53313.5 (a) 
Public Resources Code Section 5784.39 
Public Resources Code Section 5782.18 
Government Code Section 53313 (c) 
Revenue and Taxation Code Section 7202.6 
Government Code Section 53313.5 (a) 
Government Code Section 53313.5 (a) 
Public Resources Code Section 5566 
Government Code Section 53313 (c) 
Santa Clara County 
Open-Space 
Authority Open space acquisition Public Resources Code Section 35171 
Bay area counties' 
transportation 
coomissions Transactions and use tax Public Utilities Code Section 131000 
Special tax. 
Special tax under the Mello-Roos Act. 
Identical to the tax powers of fire protection districts. 
Special tax. 
Identical to the tax powers of fire protection districts. 
Special tax under the Metto-Roos Act. 
Special tax under the Mello-Roos Act. 
Special tax under the Mello-Roos Act. 
Added by AB 4158 (N. Waters, 1990), effective July 1990. 
Identical to the tax powers of fire protection districts. 
Special tax under the Mello-Roos Act. 
A redevelopment agency's sales tax must be offset by a complementary 
decrease in the underlying city or county's sales tax rate. 
Special tax under the Mello-Roos Act. 
Special tax under the Mello-Roos Act. 
Special tax. 
Special tax under the Mello-Roos Act. 
Special tax. 
Can be adopted by any or all of the nine Bay Area counties. 
CJ:I 
I 
'-.J 
County 
transportation 
conmissions or 
authorities Transactions and use tax Public Utilities Code Section 131100 
Local transportation 
authorities Transactions and use tax Public Utilities Code Section 180000 
Fresno County 
Transportation 
Authority 
Los Angeles County 
Transportation 
Conmission 
Orange County 
Transportation 
Conmission 
Riverside County 
Transportation 
Conrnission 
San Bernardino 
County 
Transportation 
Conrnission 
San Diego County 
Regional 
Transportation 
Transactions and use tax Public Utilities Code Section 142000 
Transactions and use tax Public Utilities Code Section 130350 
Transactions and use tax Public Utilities Code Section 130400 
Transactions and use tax Public Utilities Code Section 240000 
Transactions and use tax Public Utilities Code Section 190000 
Commission Transactions and use tax Public Utilities Code Section 132000 
Santa Clara County 
Traffic Authority Transaction and use tax Public Utilities Code Section 140000 
T uo llJII'le County 
Traffic Authority Transactions and use tax Public Utilities Code Section 150000 
Declared a general tax in LACTC v. Richmond (1982) 31 Cal. 3d 197. 
co 
I 
co 
Orange County 
Regional Justice 
Facility Financing 
Agency Transactions and use tax Government Code Section 26295 
San Diego County 
Regional Justice 
Facility Financing 
Revenue and Taxation Code Section 7252.30 
Agency Transactions and use tax Government Code Section 26250 
San Joaquin County 
Regional Justice 
Facility Financing 
Revenue and Taxation Code Section 7252.11 
Agency Transactions and use tax Government Code Sections 26290 & 53721.5 
Revenue and Taxation Code Section 7252.12 
County regional 
justice facility 
Declared to be a general tax. 
financing agencies Transactions and use tax Government Code Section 26299.000 & 53721.6 Declared to be general taxes. Applies only in Humboldt, Los Angeles, River-
Revenue and Taxation Code Section 7252.15 side, San Bernardino, and Ventura counties. In litigation. 
School districts Child care facilities Government Code Section 53313.5 (d) Special district under the Mello-Roos Act. 
Child care insurance Government Code Section 53313.5 (d) Special tax under the Mello-Roos Act; a school district can finance 
insurance costs but not the "other operational costs" of child care 
facilities. 
School facilities Government Code Section 53313.5 (b) Special tax under the Mello-Roos Act. 
School programs Government Code Section 50079 "Qualified" special taxes. 
c:o 
I 
1.0 
PROGRAM 
Ambulance service 
Any county service 
Any facility 
Child care facilities 
Child care insurance 
Fire protection 
Flood and storm water 
services 
Graffiti removal and 
prevention 
AUTHORITY 
Government Code Section 53313 (b) 
Health and Safety Code Section 13913 
Sec. 70, Chap. 375, Stats. of 1986 
Revenue and Taxation Code Section 7285 
Revenue and Taxation Code Section 7285.5 
Government Code Section 25210.6a 
Government Code Section 53313.5 (g) 
Government Code Section 53313.5 (d) 
Government Code Section 53313.5 (d) 
Government Code Section 25210.59 
Government Code Section 53313 (b) 
Government Code Section 53978 
Health and Safety Code Section 13913 
Public Resources Code Section 5566 
Public Resources Code Section 5782.18 
Public Utilities Code Section 16463.5 
Water Code Section 31120 
Water Code Section 71680 
Government Code Section 53313 (c) 
Revenue and Taxation Code Section 7287 
"AN INVENTORY OF LOCAL TAX POWERS" 
TABLE II: TAX AUTHORITY, BY PROGRAM 
COMMENTS 
Special tax under the Mello-Roos Act. 
Fire protection districts and other districts which have the same powers. 
Coast life Support District's special tax. 
Counties can levy sales taxes for general purposes with majority voter approval. 
Counties can set up authorities to levy sales taxes with majority vote. 
County service areas• special taxes can fund any service that a county can provide. 
Any city, county, or special district can finance any facility with a special tax under the 
Mello-Roos Act. 
Special tax under the Mello-Roos Act. 
Mello-Roos Act special taxes can finance insurance costs but not the "other operational costs" 
of child care facilities. 
County service areas• special tax. 
Special tax under the Mello-Roos Act. 
Any agency which provides fire protection can use this authority. 
Fire protection districts and other districts which have the same powers. 
Regional park and open space districts• special tax. 
Recreation and park districts' special tax. 
Public utilities districts• special tax. 
County water districts• special tax. 
Municipal water districts' special tax. 
Special tax under the Mello-Roos Act. 
Special tax on spray paint cans and markers; added by AB 3580 (Katz, 1990). 
OJ 
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Hospital services 
Justice facilities 
Library facilities 
Library services 
Mosquito abatement 
Museum and cultural 
programs 
Open space facilities 
Paramedic services 
Park facilities 
Park programs 
Pest abatement 
Recreation programs 
Government Code Section 53730.01 
Government Code Section 26250 
Government Code Section 26290 
Government Code Section 26295 
Government Code Section 26299.000 
Government Code Section 53721.5 
Government Code Section 53721.6 
Revenue and Taxation Code Section 7252.11 
Revenue and Taxation Code Section 7252.12 
Revenue and Taxation Code Section 7252.15 
Revenue and Taxation Code Section 7252.30 
Government Code Section 53313.5 (c) 
Government Code Section 53313 (c) 
Government Code Section 53717 
Government Code Section 25842.5 
Health and Safety Code Section 2303 
Government Code Section 53313 (c) 
Government Code Section 53313.5 (a) 
Public Resources Code Section 35171 
Government Code Secti.on 53313 (b) 
Government Code Section 53313.5 (a) 
Public Resources Code Section 5566 
Public Resources Code Section 5784.39 
Health and Safety Code Section 2871.8 
Government Code Section 53313 (c) 
Public Resources Code Section 5566 
Hospital districts' special tax. 
San Diego County Regional Justice Facility Financing Agency's sales tax. 
San Joaquin County Regional Justice Facility Financing Agency's sales tax. 
Orange County Regional Justice Facility Financing Agency's sales tax. 
County regional justice facility financing agencies• sales taxes. 
San Joaquin County Regional Justice Facility Financing Agency's sales tax. 
County regional justice facility financing agencies• sales taxes. 
San Diego County Regional Justice Facility Financing Agency's sales tax. 
San Joaquin County Regional Justice Facility Financing Agency's sales tax. 
County regional justice facility financing agencies• sales taxes. 
Orange County Regional Justice Facility Financing Agency's sates tax. 
Special tax under the Mello-Roos Act. 
Special tax under the Mello·Roos Act. 
Any agency which provides Library services can use this authority. 
Counties have the same tax authority as mosquito abatement districts. 
Mosquito abatement districts' special tax. 
Special tax under the Mello·Roos Act. 
Special tax under the Mello-Roos Act. 
Santa Clara County Open-Space Authority's special tax. 
Special tax under the Mello-Roos Act. 
Special tax under the Mello-Roos Act. 
Regional park and open space districts' special tax 
Recreation and park districts• special tax; added by AB 4158 (N. Waters, 1990). 
Pest abatement districts• special tax. 
Special tax under the Mello-Roos Act. 
Regional park and open space districts• special tax. 
0 
School facilities 
School programs 
Transportation 
programs 
Underground utilities 
Public Resources Code Section 5784.39 
Government Code Section 53313.5 (b) 
Government Code Section 50079 
Public Utilities Code Section 130350 
Public Utilities Code Section 130400 
Public Utilities Code Section 131000 
Public Utilities Code Section 131100 
Public Utilities Code Section 132000 
Public Utilities Code Section 140000 
Public Utilities Code Section 142000 
Public Utilities Code Section 150000 
Public Utilities Code Section 180000 
Public Utilities Code Section 190000 
Public Utilities Code Section 240000 
Government Code Section 53313.5 (e) 
Recreation and park districts• special tax; added by AB 4158 (N. Waters, 1990). 
Special tax under the Mello-Roos Act. 
School districts' "qualified" special tax. 
Los Angeles County Transportation Commission's sales tax. 
Orange County Transportation Commission's sales tax. 
Bay area counties• transportation commissions' sales taxes. 
County transportation commissions' sales taxes. 
San Diego County Regional Transportation Commission's sales tax. 
Santa Clara County Traffic Authority's sales tax. 
Fresno County Transportation Authority's sales tax. 
Tuolumne County Traffic Authority's sales tax. 
Local transportation authorities' sales taxes. 
San Bernardino County Transportation Commission's sales tax. 
Riverside County Transportation Commission's sales tax. 
Special tax under the Mello-Roos Act. 
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You have asked what effect the Alcohol Tax Act of 1990 
(hereafter "Alcohol Tax Act") and the Taxpayers Right to Vote Act 
of 1990 (hereafter "Taxpayers Act") would each have on the other 
should both initiatives qualify and be adopted by the voters at 
the November 6, 1990, general election. 
The Alcohol Tax Act would impose a $0.05 surcharge on 
each unit, as defined, of alcoholic beverages, and would deposit 
moneys from that surcharge into an "Alcohol Surtax Fund," 
containing five separate accounts. Each account would be 
appropriated for specified purposes, including, among others, 
substance abuse prevention and treatment, law enforcement, 
shelter, and educational and recreational programs. In addition, 
the Alcohol Tax Act would add Section 7 to Article XIII A of the 
California Constitution to provide that the act shall not be 
subject to Section 3 of that article, which requires that any 
increase in state taxes for purposes of raising revenue be 
approved by a two-thirds vote of each house of the Legislature. 
The Taxpayers Act would require that the imposition or 
increase of any tax by a statewide initjative or any local tax be 
subject to approval by either a simpl2 or two-thirds majority of 
the voters. The act further provides that its requirements shall 
be effective on November 6, 1990, the date of the 1990 general 
election, and additionally provid0.s, as specified, that its 
provisions shall prevail over or nullify any conflicting 
initiative adopted at the same election. 
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In particular, four provisions of the Taxpayers Act 
bear upon the act's effect, if adopted, on other concurrently 
adopted initiatives. 
First, the Taxpayers Act would add a new Section 3 to 
Article XIII A of the California Constitution to require that 
general taxes adopted by initiative be adopted only by a majority 
of the voters, and that special taxes adopted by initiative be 
adopted only by two-thirds of the voters. Subdivision (e) of the 
new Section 3 would, for purposes of the Taxpayers Act, define a 
general tax as a tax to be "levied for the general fund to be 
utilized for general governmental purposes" and a special tax as a 
tax to be "levied for a specific purpose or purposes or deposited 
into a fund or funds other than the general fund." 
Second, subdivision (d) of the new Section 3 to be added 
to Article XIII A of the California Constitution would require any 
special tax with respect to tangible personal property enacted on 
or after November'6, 1990, to be an ad valorem tax and comply 
with certain exis'ting provisions of the California Constitution 
relative to taxation of personal property. 
Third, Section 10 of the Taxpayers Act specifically 
provides that "this Act shall take effect on November 6, 1990," 
the day of the 1990 general election. 
Fourth, Section 11 of the Taxpayers Act provides that, 
if the Taxpayers Act and another measure on the same ballot 
conflict and the Taxpayers Act receives the greater number of 
votes, the Taxpayers Act controls "in its entirety" and the "other 
measure shall be null and void and without effect." Moreover, if 
the constitutional amendments in the Taxpayers Act conflict with 
the statutory provisions of another measure on the same ballot, 
regardless of the vote, the Taxpayers Act again provides that it 
controls in its entirety, and the "other measure shall be null and 
void and without effect." 
Section 11 of the Taxpayers Act is not a provision that 
would be added to the California Constitution, but is a "plus" 
section in the measure. As such, although the matter is far from 
clear, we think that the section would not be accorded 
constitutional dignity but would be given at most the effect of an 
uncodified statute and could perhaps merely be construed to be 
intent language. That is, this section would not prevail over 
conflicting constitutional provisions. In this connection, we 
point out that subdivision (b) of Section 10 of Article II 
provides that only the conflicting provisions of a measure, as 
opposed to the entire measure, receiving the highest number of 
votes prevails. Nevertheless, as discussed below, the 
characterization of Section 11 of the Taxpayers Act, as either a 
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constitutional provision or a statute, may have a significant 
effect upon the analysis of the combined effects of the two 
measures in question here and it is important that the uncertainty 
regarding this characterization be kept in mind. 
In view of the foregoing, including the uncertainty as 
to whether Section 11 of the Taxpayers Act would be given the 
effect of a constitutional provision which is intended to 
supersede conflicting constitutional provisions, we shall discuss 
the combined effect of the Alcohol Tax Act and the Taxpayers Act, 
which in our view is dependent upon four major issues regarding 
the latter initiative. First, does the broad reach of the 
Taxpayers Act violate the single subject rule? Second, would the 
existing constitutional rules or the conflict provisions in 
Section 11 of the Taxpayers Act require the nullification of the 
Alcohol Tax Act? Third, would the Taxpayers Act be deemed a 
"revision" of the California Constitution? Fourth, would the 
Taxpayers Act, if adopted, be effective and operative from the 
beginning of the day of the general election, and thereby on its 
face nullify any concurrently adopted tax initiative not adopted 
pursuant to the act's specific vote requirements? 
SINGLE SUBJECT RULE 
In view of the possibility that the vote requirements of 
the Taxpayers Act, if effective from the beginning of Election 
Day, November 6, 1990, could retroactively and prospectively 
impact numerous and diverse measures (including the Alcohol Tax 
Act) and that other provisions of the Taxpayers Act could be 
construed to affect constitutional rules governing the resolution 
of substantive conflicts in one or more measures approved at the 
same election, we shall examine whether the Taxpayers Act is 
violative of the single subject rule. 
Subdivision (d) of Section 8 of Article II of the 
California Constitution provides, as follows: 
"(d) An initiative measure embracing more 
than one subject may not be submitted to the 
electors or have any effect." 
A similar rule applies to legislative enactments and 
requires that a statute embrace but one subject, which must be 
expressed in its title, and, if a statute embraces a subject not 
expressed in its title, only the part not expressed is void 
(Sec. 9, Art. IV, Cal. const.). The same principles relating to 
the single subject rule apply to both initiatives and legislative 
enactments (Harbor v. Deukmejian, 43 Cal. 3d 1078, 1098, citing 
Perry v. Jordan, 34 Cal. 2d 87). There is, however, no 
requirement that the subject of the initiative measure be 
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expressed in the title, as prepared by the Attorney General 
(Harbor v. Deukmejian, supra, p. 1098; subd. (d), Sec. 10, 
Art. II, Cal. Const.; Sees. 3502 and 3503, Elec. C.). 
As applied to initiative measures, the single subject 
rule has the dual purpose of avoiding logrolling and voter 
confusion (Harbor v. Deukmejian, supra, at p. 1098). 
"Logrolling" has been described as the practice of aggregating 
the votes of those who favor parts of the initiative measure into 
a majority for the whole, even though it is possible that some or 
all of its provisions are not supported by a majority of the 
voters (Brosnahan v. Brown, 32 Cal. 3d 236, 279, dissenting 
opinion of Bird, C.J.). 
In summarizing the holdings of prior cases involving the 
single subject rule, the California supreme Court in Harbor stated 
that a measure complies with the single subject rule if its 
provisions are either functionally related to one another or are 
reasonably germane to one another or the objects of the enactment 
(Harbor v. Deukmejian, supra, at p. 1100). 
By way of background, in Evans v. Superior Court, 
215 Cal. 58, the California Supreme Court held that a legislative 
act that adopted the entire Probate Code in one enactment with a 
title declaring that it was an "act to revise and consolidate the 
law relating to probate ... to repeal certain provisions of law 
therein revised and consolidated and therein specified; and to 
establish a Probate Code" did not violate the single subject rule 
as applied to legislative enactments (Sec. 9, Art. IV, Cal. 
Const.; Evans v. Superior Court, supra, at p. 63). The court 
determined that the subjects referred to in the classification of 
laws included in the code carried into the title of the act and 
were germane to, and had a necessary or a natural connection 
with, probate law and procedure (Evans v. Superior Court, supra, 
at p. 64) . 
Among the principles applied by the court in reaching 
its determination was one which states that provisions governing 
projects so related and interdependent as to constitute a single 
scheme may be properly included within a single act, and one which 
establishes that a provision which conduces to the act, or which 
is auxiliary to and promotive of its main purpose, or has a 
necessary and natural connection with such purpose is germane 
within the rule (Evans v. Superior Court, supra, at pp. 63 
and 64). 
In more recent cases, the rules laid down in Evans v. 
Superior Court, supra, have been relied upon to uphold initiative 
measures challenged on the ground that they embraced more than 
one subject. Thus, in determining the applicability of those 
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principles to the iat measure ified as Proposition 13 
on the ballot the June 6, 1978, direct election, the 
California Supreme Court noted that, while the measure had several 
collateral effects, the several elements of the measure were 
reasonably to, funct lly related in furtherance 
of, a common underly case, was real 
property tax relief, and the rule of 
germaneness and the of functional 
relationship (see School District 
v. Board of , Cal. 3d 208, at p. 230).1 
However, so hold , the Amador court d not address the 
question of whether the single ect rule as applied to an 
init requires that a measure meet both the "reasonably 
germane" and "functionally related 11 tests. 
Subsequently, the court determ that an initiative 
measure wh Pol 1 Reform Act of 1974 
(Proposition 9, June 4, 1974, direct primary election), and which 
combined provisions regulating various aspects of elections to 
public office, ballot measure petitions and elections, public 
officials' conflicts of interest, and act ies of lobbyists did 
not violate the single subject requirement of subdivision (d) of 
Section 8 of Article II of the California Constitution (Fair 
Political Practices Com. v. Superior Court, 25 Cal. 3d 33, 37-43). 
The court rejected the contention that a more restrictive test 
should be applied determin 1 single 
subject requirement licable to iat s than to the same 
requirement applicable to legislation and adhered to the 
reasonab test for both iat s and 1 islation, 
finding no reason to hold that the people's reserved power of 
legislation is more limited than granted to the Legislature 
(Fair Political Practices v. Court, supra, 
at p. 42). 
1 Shortly before Amador was decided, a single subject 
challenge was made to another initiative measure. In that case, 
the Attorney General refused to prepare a title and summary for a 
proposed initiative on the ground that it violated the single 
subject rule. The California Supreme Court held that his duty in 
this regard was ministerial, and that he was not authorized by the 
California Constitution to refuse tion of title and 
summary without prior judie 1 authorization (Schmitz v. Younger, 
21 Cal. 3d 90. A dissenting opinion by Justice Manuel suggested 
that the single subject rule should be applied more strictly to 
initiative measures than to legislative bills, and that the 
"functionally related" test was the appropriate standard by which 
to measure compliance of initiat with the rule (Schmitz v. 
Younger, supra, at pp. 98-100). 
-6 
Honorable Lloyd G. Connelly - p. 6 - #446 
More recently, the court held that the constitutional 
and statutory provisions of the initiative measure known as the 
Victims' Bill of Rights (Proposition 8, June 8, 1982, direct 
primary election) , which included regulations applicable to 
restitution, safe schools, truth-in-evidence, bail, use of prior 
convictions, diminished capacity and insanity, punishment of 
habitual criminals, victims' statements, plea bargaining, 
sentencing, and mentally disordered sex offenders, were reasonably 
germane to each other and thus satisfied the requirement that 
initiative measures embrace a single subject (Brosnahan v. Brown, 
supra, at p. 253). 
The court stated that an initiative measure would not 
violate the single subject requirement if, despite its varied 
collateral effects, all of its parts are reasonably germane to 
each other and to the general purpose or object of the initiative 
(Brosnahan v. Brown, supra, at p. 245). 
The several facets of Proposition 8 were deemed to bear 
a common concern, general object, or general subject promoting 
the rights of actual or potential crime victims (Brosnahan v. 
Brown, supra, at p. 247). The court described the initiative 
measure as a reform aimed at certain features of the criminal 
justice system to pr6tect and enhance the rights of crime 
victims, and stated that this goal was the readily discernible 
common thread which united all of the initiative's provisions in 
advancing its common purpose (Brosnahan v. Brown, supra). In so 
doing, the court rejected a contention that the provisions of an 
initiative measure must be interdependent or interlocking to meet 
the single subject test (Brosnahan v. Brown, supra, at p. 249). 
Thus, in summarizing its prior holdings, the Harbor court stated 
that "this court [in Brosnahan) rejected the claim that the single 
subject rule requires that a measure meet both the 'reasonably 
germane' and 'functionally related' tests, and held that either 
standard would satisfy the constitutional requirement" (Harbor v. 
Deukmejian, supra, at p. 1099). 
Hence, an initiative measure complies with the single 
subject rule of subdivision (d) of Section 8 of Article II of the 
California Constitution if its provisions are either functionally 
related to one another or are reasonably germane to one another or 
the objects of the enactment (Harbor v. Deukmejian, supra, at 
p. 1100). 
More recently, a court of appeal declared one 
initiative proposed for the November 8, 1988, general election 
ballot to be invalid in its entirety as violative of the single 
subject rule, but, against similar contentions, upheld the 
validity of a separate initiative measure proposed for the same 
ballot. 
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limitations on banki a authorized them to compete 
in the insurance i other which restricted the 
regulation of insurance-related cases, among 
others (see Insurance Campaign Committee v. 
Eu, supra, at pp. 965-966). The removal of restrictions on banks 
to sell insurance products was related to the general purpose of 
the in iative of moderat the cost of insurance to the consumer 
through increased it , the attorneys' fees provision 
was substantially to the object of enhancing the access 
of consumers to competent 1 1 counsel to pursue legitimate 
insurance claims against insurers who engage in unfair practices, 
as set forth in an express statement of purpose (Id., at pp. 965 
and 967). Since both provisions satisfied the "reasonably 
germane" portion of the single subject rule, the court denied the 
petition for the writ.4 
As previously discussed above, the Taxpayers Act 
purports to apply, on election day itself and in omnibus fashion, 
vote requirements to nullify any taxation initiative adopted 
concurrently but not in conformity with those vote requirements. 
Thus in the context of the single subject rule, the first problem 
raised by the Taxpayers Act is whether the act, in providing for 
the nullification of any initiative imposing a tax and not meeting 
the act's vote requirements, extends its reach to more than one 
subject. 
Fundamentally, there is no precise method of determining 
what types of provisions in what initiatives would be voided by 
way of the Taxpayers Act's vote requirements. In particular, 
while affected initiatives may impose a tax, those initiatives 
may also deal with substantive matters apart from taxation. With 
regard to the Alcohol Tax Act, the act arguably deals with both 
the imposition of surcharges on alcoholic beverages, and with the 
establishment of new programs to address the many and costly 
effects on society of alcohol consumption. 
Viewed most favorably for the proponents of the 
Taxpayers Act, it may be argued that the act's goal is to ensure 
that taxes, whether statewide or local, are adopted in accordance 
with what the voters deem to be a proper requisite vote of either 
the Legislature or the electorate and that the consequences of its 
language are germane to that goal. In this connection, it could 
4 The court also stated that, because the initiative process 
had advanced to a point where preelection review was 
inappropriate, it would be well within its discretion to deny the 
petition for the writ on this ground alone, even though it 
considered the merits of the petition (see Insurance Industry 
Initiative Campaign Committee v. Eu, supra, note 2 at p. 964). 
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broader Taxpayers Act has an almost 
unlimited rity the programmatic 
portions of measures that may be approved by the voters and made 
void in their entirety covers the entire expanse of human 
imagination. Viewed in a slightly different fashion, the effect 
of the Taxpayers Act is the same as a measure that contained a 
repeal of every measure on the ballot that contained a tax 
increase not approved by the requisite vote. 
Moreover, the rs Act raises another lem of 
perhaps even greater significance the context of the single 
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of the ion determining how to resolve 
confl measures at the same ection. 
That change, we , is tota unre ated to the subject of 
procedural irements the adoption of taxes. 
That is, in the context of a measure that deals with the 
broad f l requirements for the adoption of 
taxes, we provision to modify the 
provis the Ca i i resolving conflicts 
among different measures cons the same election would be 
violat of the s ect In that connection, we also 
think any such provision would necessarily have to be adopted in a 
separate measure which takes effect prior to the adoption of any 
measure intended to affected thereby. 
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Accord ly, we th court would conclude that a 
measure that attempts to deal of the matters discussed 
above has no central uni , causes substantial voter 
confusion, and, therefore, v lates the single subject rule. In 
that event, since the California Constitution provides that an 
initiative measure more subject may not have 
any effect (subd. (d) Sec. B, Art. II, Cal Const.), the entire 
measure would not have force or effect, and would not be 
valid. 
CONFLICTS 
Notwithstanding the conclusion reached above that the 
Taxpayers Act violates the single subject rule, since a court may 
determine otherwise, or in the alternative, since a court may 
decide to sever the offending provision (which is something no 
California court has ever done) , we shall proceed to analyze the 
effect of each initiative should both be adopted. 
At this point, it is necessary to determine whether the 
Alcohol Tax Act would impose, under the provisions of the 
Taxpayers Act, either a general or special tax. As revenues from 
the surcharge imposed by the Alcohol Tax Act would be placed in 
particular accounts in a special fund, to be expended for 
specified, limited purposes, we think the Alcohol Tax Act would, 
under the provisions of the rs Act, impose a special tax 
requiring a two-thirds vote for ion. We will assume for 
purposes of analyzing the combined effect of the two initiatives 
should they both be adopted, that the cohol Tax Act would be 
adopted by only a simple majority of the voters, short of the two-
thirds majority required by the Taxpayers Act. 
The Californ Constitution provides in two separate 
articles that if the provisions of two or more measures approved 
at the same elect , those of the measure receiving the 
highest affirmative vote shall prevail (subd. (b), Sec. 10, 
Art. II; Sec. 4, Art. XVIII, Cal. Const.). The first reference to 
the resolution of this potential confl is made in the context 
of the initiative and referendum process and the second reference 
is made in the context of constitutional amendments and 
constitutional revis 
The rule providing for the measure receiving the 
highest affirmative vote to prevail in the event of a conflict, 
was first added to Section 1 of Article IV of the California 
Constitution in 1911, at the time that the right to the initiative 
and referendum was first created in the California Constitution 
(see former Sec. 1, Art. IV, Cal. Const.). This language remained 
in Section 1 of Article IV until the November 8, 1966, general 
election. At that election, this conflict rule was incorporated 
11 
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into new subd ision (b) of S f Article IV of the 
California Canst ion. The made by the addition 
of subd ision (b) was classified by the California Constitution 
Revision Commission as containing on y modest s in 
phraseology and no change mean (Proposed Rev sion of the 
California Constitution, February 1966, California Constitution 
Revision Commission, p. 47 . A amendment and 
of subd ision b) of Section 24 of Article IV, 
the l of that former subd ision being set 
forth in identical text current subd ision (b) of Section 10 
of Article II (June 8, 1976, direct primary election). Thus, 
there has been no attempt to change meaning of the language in 
issue since its original introduction into the California 
Constitution in 1911. 
As to the conflict language contained in Section 4 of 
Article XVIII, that language was added to that article apparently 
to clarify that the conflict rule applies to amendments proposed 
by the Legislature (General Election Ballot Pamphlet, 
November 3, 1970, p. 27: see also Transcripts of June 4, 1964, 
meeting of the California Constitution Revision Commission, at 
pp. 57-66). 
The courts have held that the rule set out in 
subdivision (b) of Section 10 of Article II of the California 
Constitution should only be invoked if initiative provisions 
cannot be harmonized, and the courts are required to try to give 
statutes adopted by the voters "concurrent operation and effect" 
(Estate of Gibson, 139 Cal. . 3d 733, 736). Once an 
irreconcilable conflict been established, a determination must 
be made as to whether those provisions to be voided are severable 
from the remaining portions of the affected initiative (Santa 
Barbara Sch. Dist. v. Superior Court, 13 Cal. 3d 315, 330). 
Apart from the foregoing authority, Section 11 of the 
Taxpayers Act proposes to resolve conflicts with other 
initiatives as follows: 
"SECTION 11. Conflicting Law. Pursuant to 
Article II, Sec. lO(b) of the California 
Constitution, if this measure and another measure 
appear on the same ballot and conflict, and this 
measure receives more affirmat votes than such 
other measure, this measure shall become effective 
and control in its entirety and said other measure 
shall be null and void and without effect. If the 
constitutional amendments contained in this 
measure conflict with the statutory provisions of 
another measure on this ballot, the constitutional 
provisions of this measure shall become effective 
f:-1? 
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and control in their enti 
measure shall be null and vo i 
other 
ive of the 
margins of approval. This initiative is 
inconsistent with any other initiative on the same 
ballot that enacts any tax, that employs a method 
of computat , or that conta a rate not 
authorized by this measure, and any such other 
measure shall be null and vo and without 
effect." 
As previously above, Section 11 of the 
Taxpayers Act is not a provision that would be added to the 
California Constitution, but is a "plus" section in the measure. 
As such, while the matter is far from being clear, we do not think 
it is a constitutional provision that is controlling over 
conflicting constitutional provisions, such as subdivision (b) of 
Section 10 of Article II, which provides that the conflicting 
provisions of the measure, as opposed to the entire measure, 
receiving the highest number of votes prevails. Thus, in this 
case, if the Alcohol Tax Act is approved by the voters with fewer 
votes than the Taxpayers Act, the provisions of the Alcohol Tax 
Act, if any, not in conflict with the Taxpayers Act, and severable 
from the other portions of the measure, would still be given 
effect (see Santa Barbara Sch. Dist. v. Superior Court, supra, 
pp. 330-332; see also Taxpayers to Limit Campaign Spending v. Fair 
Pol. Practices Com., 212 Cal. 3d 991, 1011-1012, respondent's 
petition for review granted by California Supreme Court, 12/7/89}. 
As to the severability of remaining sections of the 
Alcohol Tax Act, the California Supreme Court has established a 
three-step test applicable to both initiative measures and 
legislative enactments as follows: First, is the language of the 
statute mechanically severable? Second, can the severed sections 
be applied independently? Third, would the severed portions have 
been adopted by the voters if they had known in advance that 
portions of the initiative would be nullified (Santa Barbara Sch. 
Dist. v. Superior Court, supra, 330-332)? 
In that regard, we think there is nothing in the Alcohol 
Tax Act that is severable from the tax provisions. Generally, the 
Alcohol Tax Act does two things: it provides for the imposition 
of taxes and the manner in which the revenues from those taxes are 
to be spent. Using the tests of severability established by the 
courts, we think that the severing of the portion of the Alcohol 
Tax Act providing for the expenditure of funds does not make any 
sense if there are no funds to expend. 
With regard to the two initiatives in question, a 
conflict arguably exists between provisions of the Taxpayers Act 
adding a new Section 3 to Article XIII A of the California 
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provisions of the Cali Constitution are to be harmonized 
with each other rather be to conflict (Board of 
Supervisors of Diego , 27 Cal. 3d 855, 866; 
Penziner v. West American , 10 Cal. 2d 160). 
Moreover, pr iples of statutory construction, 
generally applicable to const ions ( v. Allen, 54 Cal. 
353, 356; 49 Cal. . 2d 671, 681), also 
ind that the the Alcohol Tax Act may be 
construed as a on rather than a conflicting rival 
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rece more votes, or, alternat , i measures are 
approved the voters and Act receives more votes, 
but the court sures are not 
substant ly measures harmonized 
by treat the add ion to Article XIII A as an 
exception to Section 3 of Art le XIII A, as by the 
Taxpayers Act, then in either event, the Alcohol Tax Act would be 
given effect. In that case, the Taxpayers Act generally would be 
effective as to any measure that d not receive more votes 
and measures proposed in the future. 
AMENDMENT vs. REVISION 
In addition to the policy reasons mentioned by the 
courts to support withholding an initiative measure from the 
ballot that violates the single subject rule (see, Brosnahan v. 
Eu, 31 Cal. 3d 1, 6-B, concurring and dissenting opinion of Mosk, 
J.), there also exists the add ional consideration of the 
constitutional limitation on the power of the electors to work a 
revision of the California Constitution by initiative. That is, 
the California Constitution permits the initiative power to be 
exercised only for the purpose of amending the Constitution (Sec. 
3, Art. XVIII, Cal. Const.). A proposed initiative measure which, 
because of the impact of its provisions, works a revision of the 
Constitution, is subject to being wi ld from the ballot by 
court order (see McFadden v. 32 Cal. 2d 330). 
Section 1 of Article XVIII of the California 
Constitution permits the Legislature, by rollcall vote entered in 
the journal, two-thirds of the membership in each house 
concurring, to propose an amendment or revision of the 
Constitution. In contrast, s ion 3 f icle XVIII of the 
California Constitution om the term "revision" and provides 
that electors may only "amend" the Constitution by initiative. 
The definitions of 11 amendment" and "revision," as used 
in Arti e XVIII of the i Constitution, are set forth in 
the analysis of Propos ion 7 on November 6, 1962, general 
election ballot. According to that analysis, "amendments" are 
specific and limited changes in the Constitution, while 
"revisions" are broad changes in all or a substantial part thereof 
(Prop. 7 on the November 6, 1962, ballot). Not only are these two 
words distinct definition, but the dist ion has become a 
matter of practical importance: h storically, the 
Constitution has prescribed a different procedure for the 
implementation of each. 
The Constitution is an instrument of a "permanent and 
abiding nature" (McFadden v. Jordan, supra, at p. 333), and the 
provisions for its "revision" have always reflected the will of 
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the le mainta the under ing principles and permanent 
nature of the document. or to 1962, proposals for 
constitutional "revisions" could only be presented to the voters 
by a constitutional convention convened by the Legislature for 
that purpose (see Sec. 2, Art. XVIII, Cal. Canst.). In contrast, 
''amendments" could be effected by an initiative from the people or 
a proposal by the Legislature. 
At the November 6, 1962, general election, Section 1 of 
Article XVIII was amended to authorize the Legislature to propose 
and submit to the people a "revision" of all or part of the 
California Constitution in the same manner as "amendments" to the 
Constitution. However, the initiative power of the people was not 
expanded when the Legislature's power to propose changes in the 
Constitution was increased in 1962. 
At the 1970 general election, when Section 3 of 
Article XVIII of the California Constitution was added, reference 
to "amending" the Constitution by initiative was included "to 
assure the Article mentions all methods for changing the 
Constitution" (Proposed Revision of the California Constitution, 
California Constitution Revision Commission 1966-1971, Comment, 
110). Again, the initiative power was not expanded to include 
"revisions," but remains in principle as it did when first added 
to the Constitution in 1911. 
As previously discussed above, the stature of Section 11 
of the Taxpayers Act, as a constitutional or statutory provision, 
is far from being clear. While we think Section 11 of the 
Taxpayers Act would be viewed as something akin to a statute, 
Section 11 of the Taxpayers Act nevertheless would propose to 
resolve any conflicts with other initiatives and legislatively 
proposed constitutional amendments in such a way as to, in effect, 
exempt, in part, the Taxpayers Act from the constitutional rule 
providing for the measure receiving the highest affirmative vote 
to prevail only with respect to the substantive conflicting 
provisions of the measure (subd. (b), Sec. ·10, Art. II; Sec. 4, 
Art. XVIII, Cal. Const.). 
In view of the possibility that Section 11 of the 
Taxpayers Act may be characterized as a constitutional provision 
and in view of the potential impact those provisions may have on 
various parts of the California Constitution, we think the courts 
may view Section 11 of the Taxpayers Act, together with the other 
provisions of the Taxpayers Act relating to procedural 
requirements and limitations for the imposition of taxes, as 
constituting a significant qualitative revision of the California 
Constitution, and not merely an amendment. 
17 
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As discussed above, if an initiative measure is approved by a 
majority of votes thereon, it takes effect the day after the 
election unless the measure provides otherwise (subd. (c), Sec. 8, 
and subd. (a), Sec. 10, Art. II, Cal. Const.; Sec. 4, Art. XVIII, 
Cal. Const.). 
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If, however, the Taxpayers Act is determined to be 
valid, at least in part, and is made retroactive to apply to 
measures adopted at the November 6, 1990, election and, both the 
Taxpayers Act and the Alcohol Tax Act are approved by the voters, 
and the Alcohol Tax Act receives more votes than the Taxpayers 
Act, we think the Alcohol Tax Act would prevail. Finally, if the 
Taxpayers Act receives more votes than the Alcohol Tax Act, we 
think there is a basis for a court to find that the two measures 
are not substantively in conflict and that the Taxpayers Act does 
not apply to the Alcohol Tax Act. 
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APPENDIX D 
SUMMARY OF AUGUST 15 HEARING TESTIMONY 
RELATING TO PROPOSITION 136 
Prepared by Leslie A. McFadden 
Senate Local Government Committee 
D-1 
Proposition 136 -- Taxpayers Right to Vote 
Peter Schaafsma from 
summarized the key 
Committee members. 
following: 
Analyst's Office 
Proposition 136 for 
measure does the 
e Places a definition general taxes and special 
taxes into the California Constitution on voter approval 
requirements for both state and local taxes, 
e Requires special taxes on personal property be 
imposed on a value basis (rather than a per-unit basis) and 
limits the tax rate to one percent, 
e Requires all new or increased state taxes be imposed 
by a two-thirds vote, 
e Requires special taxes enacted by initiative to 
receive a two-thirds vote, 
e Requires general tax increases to receive a majority 
vote, including the tax increases of charter law cities, and 
e Suspends the voting requirements to raise money for 
disaster relief. 
Schaafsma noted that the measure's language on how conflicts 
between itself and other measures on the ballot are resolved 
differs from current provisions in the Constitution. Propo-
sition 136 states that it invalidates all provisions of a 
conflicting constitutional measure if it receives fewer 
votes, rather than only the conflicting provisions of another 
measure. Also, a conflicting statutory measure would be com-
pletely invalid regardless of the number of votes cast. 
Proposition 136 also asserts that it conflicts with any 
measure that enacts any tax or imposes a rate it does not 
authorize. 
Prospective only. Assemblyman Bob Frazee queried whether the 
proposed measure has any retroactive provisions which would 
affect any locally adopted taxes, such as San Diego County's 
two sales tax measures. Schaafsma replied that Proposition 
136 would not effect San Diego's tax measures because it 
applies to measures passed on or after November 6, 1990. 
Imposed vs. levied? Assemblyman Sam Parr pondered whether 
there is a meaningful difference between Proposition 136 1 s 
definition of general taxes and the definition already in 
statute from Proposition 62. Proposition 136 defines general 
taxes as taxes "levied for the general fund to be utilized 
for general governmental purposes" whereas current law de-
fines general taxes as "taxes imposed for general govern-
mental purposes. Schaafsma replied that he saw no meaningful 
D-
difference, but thought the drafters of Proposition 136 might 
want to comment. Dave Doerr from the California Taxpayers' 
Association added later that the terms to him are inter-
changeable. 
In response to questions from Committee members, Lonnie 
Mathis from the Department of Finance replied that the De-
partment had not taken a position on Proposition 136 or any 
of the other initiatives being discussed at the hearing and 
had nothing to add. 
Encourages general taxation or more fees? Larry McCarthy 
from the California Taxpayers' Association noted that Cal-Tax 
strongly supports Proposition 136. He commented in general 
about the manipulation of public finance through the initia-
tive process from earmarking and other budget constraints. 
But he said that Proposition 136 is different because it 
encourages general taxation without strings and gives elected 
officials greater capacity to decide where tax dollars should 
be allocated. 
Assemblyman Steve Peace responded that Proposition 136 may 
put more power in the hands of the Legislature. He said it 
reinforces the power and opportunity of the Legislature to 
act responsibly to raise taxes if necessary, rather than 
"handing off the responsibility some place else." 
But Assemblyman Farr disagreed. He said the only easy rev-
enue source left for local governments to carry on services 
will be fees. To him, "we're going to just meter everything 
that government does in California." 
Greater local flexibility? Dave Doerr from Cal-Tax made the 
point that Proposition 136 gives local governments more 
flexibility in two ways. First, Cal-Tax reads Proposition 13 
to prohibit taxes by initiative, whereas Proposition 136 
permits voters to raise taxes by initiative. But he ack-
nowledged that this issue is now before the Supreme Court. 
He also noted that under Proposition 136, local governments 
can raise a tax they are authorized to provide without a vote 
when there is an emergency the Governor declares. 
Fred Main from the California Chamber of Commerce echoed the 
Chamber's support for Proposition 136 and added that there is 
historical precedent for the measure's two-thirds vote re-
quirement. It is not a new and different concept. 
Jim Harrington from the League of California cities strongly 
disagreed with Doerr's assessment. To Harrington, what Prop-
osition 136 does is "take us [cities] backward a great deal." 
While there has been some debate over whether Proposition 62 
applies to the 84 charter law cities, Proposition 136 clearly 
applies to them. He thinks the practical effect of the 
measure will be to shift the 
voters to businesses. To 
themselves, but they 11 
dents. 
burden of taxation from resident 
voters will not vote to tax 
to tax bus and nonresi-
He also described how the decisionmaking process on budget 
matters will become more cumbersome if Proposition 136 
passes. Even if elected officials can agree on some revenue 
measures to balance the budget and even if the amount is only 
a slight increase, they must await the outcome of a future 
election. 
Lenny Goldberg from the California Tax Reform Association 
also spoke against Proposition 136. He said cities will no 
longer be able to balance their budgets with utility user 
taxes, hotel taxes, or business license taxes without a vote 
of the people. To him, the initiative overall takes away 
"any little bit of flexibility left" for cities, counties, 
and special districts. 
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